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Article 5

BOOK ESSAY
By Peter Irons. New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 1983. Pp. xiii, 407. $18.95.

JUSTICE AT WAR.

Reviewed by Barry Sullivan*
In the months following the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor,
the United States government -first imposed a curfew on Japanese
Americans residing in the Western states and then ordered their
evacuation and detention in internment camps. These measures, as
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
has recently explained, were enforced against 120,000 men, women
and children of Japanese ancestry, American citizens as well as resident aliens, "without individual review, and . . . virtually without
regard for their demonstrated loyalty to the United States."' Indeed,
these measures were undertaken despite the absence of "a single documented act of espionage, sabotage or fifth column activity. . . by
an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese
alien on the West Coast."' 2 No similar measures were undertaken
with regard to persons of German or Italian descent.
The legal authority for these measures rested on Executive Order No. 9066, which President Roosevelt signed on February 19,
1942, a little more than two months after the attack on Pearl Harbor.3 Based on the premise that "successful prosecution of the war
require[d] every possible protection against espionage and against
sabotage" of defense installations, Executive Order No. 9066 authorized the Secretary of War and his military subordinates "to prescribe
military areas. . . from which any or all persons may be excluded,"
to impose such further restrictions as the military authorities might
see fit on "the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave" such
areas, and to provide "transportation, food, shelter, and other accom* A.B., Middlebury College, 1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974. Member of the
Illinois and Massachusetts bars. Partner, Jenner & Block, Chicago, Illinois.
I PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIvILIANS 3 (1982) (hereinafter referred to as PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED).

2 Id
3 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). In 1976, President Ford formally repealed Executive Order
No. 9066, stating that evacuation was one of our "national mistakes." 41 Fed. Reg. 7741
(1976).
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modations" to persons affected by evacuation orders. 4 On March 21,
1942, President Roosevelt signed Public Law 503, which Congress
had speedily enacted to provide criminal penalties for civilian violations of military orders issued under the authority of Executive Order
No. 9066.

5

These extraordinary measures were adopted and implemented,
with little public debate or discussion, in the bleak days following the
destruction of the Pacific Fleet. While only a handful of Japanese
Americans challenged the constitutionality of these measures during
the war, the government's wartime policy has emerged as a significant issue of public debate. In recent years, both Congress and the
courts have been asked to redress the wrongs that were admittedly
inflicted on the Japanese Americans more than 40 years ago. 6
In these circumstances, historical understanding is essential to
any reasoned discussion of current public policy. In Justice at War,
Peter Irons has offered an historical account of the formulation and
defense of the government's wartime policy towards the Japanese
Americans. The central question raised in this review is whether
Irons's account contributes to our understanding of why those events
occurred as they did. The historian's art, as Professor Butterfield has
said, "is to recapture a moment and seize upon particulars and fasten
down a contingency." ' 7 In assessing Justice at War against that standard, this essay will first review the Supreme Court's opinions in the
Japanese American cases and then consider the validity of Irons's
account in light of existing scholarship on the subject.
I.

The Japanese American Program in the Supreme Court

The constitutionality of each of the measures imposed by the
4 7 Fed. Reg. at 1407.
5 Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 503, 56 Stat. 173. Public Law 503 was reenacted as
part of another statute in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 765 (codified
at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1383). In 1976, Congress repealed this latter statute. Act of Sept. 14, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1258.
6 Congress has recently considered legislation aimed at compensating Japanese Americans for the damages they suffered because of the government's wartime policy. See, e.g., H.R.
4110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3387, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1520, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
Victims of the Japanese American program have also sought redress in the courts. See
Hohri v. United States, 586 F.Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984), appealdocketed,No. 84-5460 (D.C. Cir.
July 12, 1984) (holding that action by Japanese Americans for damages resulting from internment was barred by the statute of limitations because newly released government documents
were cumulative). For a discussion of other court cases recently filed by victims of the Japanese American program, see note 73 infra.
7 H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 66 (1931).
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military-the curfew, evacuation and detention-was litigated in the
lower federal courts in a quartet of cases which culminated in decisions by the United States Supreme Court in June 1943 and December 1944. In the first pair of cases, Hirabqyashi v. United States8 and
Jfasuiv. UnitedStates,9 a unanimous Court upheld the criminal convictions of two American citizens of Japanese ancestry who had violated
the curfew order. Hirabayashi, as the Court noted, "was born in Seattle in 1918, of Japanese parents who had come from Japan to the
United States, and who had never afterward returned to Japan;...
he was educated in the Washington public schools and at the time of
his arrest was a senior in the University of Washington; . . .he had

never been in Japan or had any association with Japanese residing
there." 10 Yasui was born in Oregon in 1916 of alien parents; he had
spent a summer in Japan when he was eight years old and had attended a part-time Japanese language school for about three years.
He had also attended public schools in Oregon, including the state
university, from which he had received his undergraduate and law
degrees. Yasui was a member of the Oregon bar and an Army Reserve officer. He "had been employed by the Japanese Consulate in
Chicago, but had resigned on December 8, 1941, and immediately
offered his services to the military authorities; . . .he had discussed

with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation the advisability
of testing the constitutionality of the curfew; and . . .he [had] re-

quested that he be arrested so that he could test its constitutionality.""
In Hirabayashiand Yasul, the Court rejected the defendants' constitutional arguments that the curfew imposed by the military violated the nondelegation doctrine and the equal protection
component of the due process clause. 12 In Hirabayashi,the lead case,
Chief Justice Stone summarily disposed of the nondelegation issue,
reasoning that Congress had ratified and confirmed Executive Order
No. 9066 when it enacted Public Law 503.13 Since the Court also
8

320 U.S. 81 (1943).

9 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
10 Id at 84.
11 Id at 116-17.
12 Id at 89-90, 94-95. The Court had not then held, of course, that "[e]qual protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); see aLso Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
13 320 U.S. at 92. The Chief Justice stated:
The question then is not one of Congressional power to delegate to the President the
promulgation of the Executive Order, but whether, acting in cooperation, Congress
and the Executive [have] constitutional authority to impose the curfew restriction
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held that the imposition of a curfew was within the constitutional
war power of the national government, the Court then considered
the curfew's constitutionality in light of its exclusive application to
persons of Japanese ancestry. The possibility of espionage and sabotage by Japanese Americans was "obvious," Chief Justice Stone said,
in "the critical days of March 1942."' ta The Chief Justice noted that
conditions prevailing on the West Coast since the nineteenth century,
which had affected American citizens of Japanese ancestry as well as
resident aliens, had led to "relatively little social intercourse between
them and the white population. 11 5 Moreover, the practical and legal
restrictions "affecting the privileges and opportunities afforded to
persons of Japanese extraction residing in the United States, have
been sources of irritation and may well have tended to increase their
isolation, and in many instances their attachments to Japan and its
6
institutions."'
Such primitive speculations, cast in the language of social science, were deemed a sufficient basis to justify the imposition of a
racially selective curfew. The Chief Justice concluded:
Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this
country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the militagt authoritiesand of Congress that there
were disloyal members of that population, whose number andstrength could
not be precisel and quicky ascertained. We cannot say that the war-

making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be
isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to
the national defense and safety, which demanded that
prompt
7
and adequate measures be taken to guard against it.1
In Hirabayashi,the defendant had also been convicted of failing "to
report to the Civil Control Station within the designated area,. . . a
... [and] whether, acting together, [they] could leave it to the designated military
commander to appraise the relevant conditions and on the basis of that appraisal to
say whether, under the circumstances, the time and place were appropriate for the
promulgation of the curfew order and whether the order itself was an appropriate
means of carrying out the Executive Order for the "protection against espionage
and against sabotage" to national defense materials, premises and utilities.
Id at 91-92.
14 Id at 96.
15 Id. at 98. The character of the evidence upon which the Court relied is well demonstrated by its assertion that some Japanese language schools "are generaly betievedto be sources
of Japanese nationalistic propaganda, cultivating allegiance to Japan." Id at 97 (emphasis
added; footnote omitted).
16 Id at 98 (emphasis added).
17 Id at 99 (emphasis added).

1984]

BOOK ESSAY

preliminary step to the exclusion from that area of persons of Japanese ancestry." 1 8 The Court avoided deciding the constitutionality
of exclusion, however, on the technical ground that concurrent
sentences had been imposed on both counts. 19 Justices Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge expressed reservations in Hirabyashi,but concurred in the judgment. 20 Justice Murphy expressed perhaps the
greatest degree of disquiet, noting that the government's action went
"to the very brink of constitutional power." 21 But even Justice Murphy was unwilling to dissent.
In Korematsu v. United States,22 which was decided in December
1944, the Court was forced to address the constitutionality of exclusion, which it upheld over the dissents of Justices Roberts, Murphy
and Jackson. 23 Consistent with the Court's reluctance to address the
constitutionality of exclusion in Hirabayashi,however, the Court in
Xorematsu avoided ruling on the constitutionality of detention.
Korematsu, "an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted," as Justice Black noted in his opinion for the majority, "for
remaining in San Leandro, California, 'a Military Area,' contrary to
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34. . . which directed that after May
9, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry should be excluded from
that area."' 24 Korematsu's loyalty to the United States was not disputed.25 It appears that Korematsu violated the exclusion order only
because he did not wish to be separated from his girlfriend, who was
of Italian ancestry, and with whom he intended to move to the interior when he had earned enough money to do so (p. 95).
Justice Black began his opinion in Korematsu with the observation that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect," but, he added, "[t]hat is not
to say that allsuch restrictions are unconstitutional. '26 After reviewing the history of the curfew and discussing the Court's opinion in
Hirabayashi,Justice Black observed that "[t]he military authorities,
charged with the primary responsibility of defending our shores,
18 Id. at 84.
19 Id at 84-85. See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 n.6 (1957).
20 Id at 105-109 (Douglas, J., concurring); id at 109-14 (Murphy, J., concurring); id at
114 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
21 Id at 111.
22 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23 Id at 225-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id at 233-42 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id at 24248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
24 Id at 215-16.
25 Id at 216.
26 Id (emphasis added).
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[had] concluded that curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion. ' 27 The constitutionality of the curfew had been upheld in Hirabqyashi"because we could not reject the finding of the
military authorities that it was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal," and the military's policy of "temporary exclusion" rested on the same footing.28 Justice
Black therefore concluded:
To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely
confuses the issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because
the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of
our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because
Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined that they should
have the power to do just this. There was evidence ofdisoyalo on the
partof some, the milita.y authoritiesconsidered that the needfor action was
great, and time was short. We cannot-by availing ourselves of the
calm perspective of hindsight-now say that at that time these
29
actions were unjustified.

The absence of hard facts to support Justice Black's well-turned
phrases did not go unnoticed by the dissenters. Justice Roberts was
wholly unpersuaded by Justice Black's facile analogy to Hirabayashi.
"This is not a case," Justice Roberts wrote, "of keeping people off the
streets at night."3 0 He continued: "On the contrary, it is the case of
convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his
loyalty and good disposition towards the United States." 3 1 Finally,
Justice Roberts stated, "I need hardly labor the conclusion that Con'32
stitutional rights have been violated.
The dissent filed by Justice Murphy was equally blunt: "Such
exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls
27

Id at 218.

28 Id at 219.
29 Id at 223-24 (emphasis added).
30 Id at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
31 Id at 226.
32 Id
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into the ugly abyss of racism. ' 33 While conceding that deference
must be accorded to the wartime judgments of "military authorities
who are on the scene and who have full knowledge of the military
facts," Justice Murphy insisted that "[i]ndividuals must not be left
impoverished of their constitutional rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor support. ' 34 Given these countervailing considerations, judicial review should not be premised
upon standards that are "too high or too meticulous," but should be
limited to the question whether the disputed action has "some reasonable relation to the removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage
'35
and espionage.
Based on his review of the evidence, Justice Murphy found no
such reasonable relation to these potential dangers. 36 Drawing heavily on the final report of Lt. Gen. J.L. DeWitt, the West Coast commanding officer in charge of evacuation, Justice Murphy concluded
that the evacuation decision was premised not on military considerations, but on "questionable racial and sociological grounds not ordinarily within the realm of expert military judgment, supplemented
by certain semi-military conclusions drawn from an unwarranted use
'37
of circumstantial evidence.
Dissenting on separate grounds, Justice Jackson effectively despaired of finding a principled basis for resolving the case.38 He was
impressed by the argument that "[n]o court can require. . a [military] commander in such circumstances to act as a reasonable man;
he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting."'39 Nonetheless, Justice Jackson continued, "if we cannot confine military expedients by
the Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve
all that the military may deem expedient." 40 Justice Jackson de33 Id at 233, quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
34 Id at 234.
35 Id at 235.
36 Id ("[T]he exclusion, either temporarily or permanently, of all persons with Japanese
blood in their veins has no such reasonable relation.").
37 Id at 236-37. Justice Murphy stated:
The reasons [invoked in support of the government's policy] appear . . . to be
largely an accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese Americans by people with
racial and economic prejudices-the same people who have been among the foremost advocates of the evacuation.
Id at 239 (footnote omitted).
38 Id at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
39 Id
40 Id
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clined to join the other dissenters in concluding that the record
showed that mass evacuation was unnecessary, but he also rejected
the majority's view as to the sufficiency of that evidence:
How does the Court know that these orders have a reasonable
basis in necessity? No evidence whatever on that subject has
been taken by this or any other court. There is sharp controversy
as to the credibility of the DeWitt report. So the Court, having

no real evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General
DeWitt's own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any
cross-examination, that what he did was reasonable. And thus it
will always be when
courts try to look into the reasonableness of a
41
military order.

In Ex parle Endo, 42 which was decided the same day as Korematsu, the Court grasped the nettle of detention only to the extent of
holding that the War Relocation Authority had no authority to detain citizens of Japanese ancestry after their loyalty had been established. A unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Douglas,
therefore ordered the release of Mitsuye Endo, a California state employee who had been evacuated from Sacramento and removed to
the Tule Lake War Relocation Center at Newell, California (p.
3
102).4
Invoking the presumption that Congress and the President
"are sensitive to and respectful of the liberties of the citizen," and
would therefore wish "to allow for the greatest possible accommodation between those liberties and the exigencies of war, '44 and in view
of the fact that "[n]either the Act nor the orders use the language of
detention, '45 the Court concluded that the political branches could
not have intended that citizens be detained beyond the time necessary to ascertain their loyalty. "When the power to detain is derived
from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage," Justice Douglas wrote, "detention which has no relationship to
that objective is unauthorized. ' '46 Thus, because "[a] citizen who is
concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage, '47 he
may not be detained. Justices Murphy and Roberts concurred in the
result, but declined, based on the views they had expressed in Kore48
matsu, to join in the Court's reasoning.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 245.
323 U.S. 283 (1944).
Id at 284-85.
Id at 300.
Id
Id at 302.
Id
Id at 307-08 (Murphy, J., concurring); id at 308-10 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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II.

The Legacy of the Japanese American Cases

The Japanese American cases illustrate the imperfect and seem-.
ingly random way in which decisions of even the greatest import are
sometimes made at the highest levels of government. 49 The questions
raised by the Japanese American cases are these: How was a policy
so fundamentally at odds with constitutional principle so readily embraced not only by the military, but by all three branches of the
national government? How, indeed, were these measures adopted
when the Attorney General and the Secretary of War both harbored
grave doubts about their constitutionality? How, moreover, were
these measures adopted, and ultimately approved by the Supreme
Court, when the principal factual justification for them-the government's alleged inability to identify and segregate disloyal Japanese
Americans within the time available-was known to be insubstantial
by many high-ranking government officials, not only when the
Supreme Court rendered judgment, but even when the initial administrative decisions were made?
Neither the government's wartime policy towards the Japanese
Americans nor the Supreme Court's ratification of that policy escaped serious scholarly attention during the war and post-war eras.5 0
49 The Japanese American cases have never been explicitly overruled, but it is not for
their value as constitutional exegesis that they command our attention. As Professor Pole has
said, the prevailing opinions "are out of character with the surrounding and ensuing cases
that involved other American minorities." J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 292 (1978).
The Japanese American cases do not speak with their own authority. They have little to
teach us about the legitimacy of race as a factor in government decision-making. See Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). ExparteMilligan surely provides a truer constitutional compass for ascertaining the proper place of civil liberties in time
of war. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). At most, to borrow a phrase used by Justice Roberts on
another occasion, the controlling opinions in the Japanese American cases are like "a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
50 As early as February 1942, a group of social scientists at the University of California at
Berkeley embarked on a multidisciplinary study of the government's Japanese American program. The field work for that study continued through December 1945 and resulted in several important scholarly works. See D. THOMAS & R. NISHIMoTo, THE SPOILAGE (1946)
(examination of social implications of the government's policy); D. THOMAS, THE SALVAGE
(1952); J. TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON, PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1954) (consideration of evacuation "in terms of its historical origins, its political characteristics, the responsibility for it, and the legal implications arising from it." Id at vi); M.
GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED:

POLITICS AND THE JAPANESE EVACUATION

(1949)

(political study of the adoption and implementation of the government's program).
In addition, two extensive and well-reasoned attacks on the Court's opinions appeared in
law reviews in 1945. Curiously, the first was written by Nanette Dembitz, a Justice Department lawyer who had helped prepare the government's Supreme Court briefs in the Japanese
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More recently, of course, the government's wartime policy towards
the Japanese Americans was the subject of an exhaustive inquiry by
the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, which reviewed voluminous published and unpublished documentary materials, conducted lengthy public hearings, and
published a comprehensive report, Persona/JusticeDenied,51 in 1982.
Although the Commission had access to previously unavailable
documentary evidence, that evidence appears to have been largely
cumulative because the Commission's report confirms the accuracy
of much that had previously been written on the subject. As the
Commission noted in its report, "[h]istorical writing about the exclusion, evacuation and detention of the ethnic Japanese has two great
set pieces-analysis of events which led to Executive Order 9066, and
life in the relocation camps," and, "[i]n large measure, these events
52
were accessible to historians from the moment they took place."
Even the earliest students of the government's Japanese American
program had access to the principal documents concerning the development of the government's policy, and they were able to interview
many of the key participants at a time when their recollections of the
relevant events were still fresh. 53 In evaluating Justice at War, one
must therefore ask whether this book, in view of the existing scholarship, materially advances our knowledge of the events that it chronicles. Although Irons interviewed a number of the key actors in this
story, and had access to previously unavailable documentary eviAmerican cases, and who was therefore partially responsible for the outcome (pp. 119, 196-97,
206). See Dembitz, Racial Dzscrininationand the MilitagJudgment. The Supreme Court's Korematsu
and Endo Decisions, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 175 (1945). The second was written by Professor
Eugene Rostow of the Yale Law School, who summed up the meaning of the Japanese American cases in these words: "The idea of punishment only for individual behavior is basic to all
systems of civilized law. A great principle was never lost so casually." Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases.- A Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489, 532 (1945). More particularly, Professor Rostow
found implicit in the prevailing opinions "five propositions of the utmost potential menace":
(1) that protective custody for periods of more than four years is a permitted form of imprisonment in the United States; (2) that the mere holding of certain political opinions justifies
imprisonment; (3) that persons of a particular ethnic group may be presumed to hold the
kind of dangerous political opinions which justify imprisonment; (4) that decisions as to
which political opinions justify imprisonment, and as to which ethnic groups may be infected
with such opinions, are decisions that may be made by military authorities in times of emergency; and (5) that the military's discretion to make and enforce such decisions is not limited
by the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Id Contrary views were also expressed in the
literature. See, e.g., Fairman, The Law of MartialRule and The NationalEmergency, 55 HARV. L.
REv. 1253 (1942).
51 See note 1 supra.
52 PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 1, at 213.
53 See, e.g., M. GRODZINS, supra note 50, at 231-322.
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dence, Irons's account does not contribute measurably to our understanding of the process which led to the adoption, defense, and
judicial vindication of the government's program.
From this perspective, Justice at War is disappointing at the outset. Only a relatively short portion of the book (pp. 18-74) discusses
the initial formulation of the government's policy towards the Japanese Americans, and, although that portion of the book is seemingly
filled with facts, Irons's account does not adequately explain the process by which this policy was adopted. While the government's litigation strategy in the Japanese American cases deserves our
attention, 54 that strategy was largely determined when the policy was
adopted. Unlike many government policies that eventually become
the subject of litigation, this policy was decided at the highest levels
of government and therefore carried an unusual degree of momentum when it was contested in the courts. The Solicitor General may
decline to defend the policy of a particular agency on the ground
that it is inconsistent with the overall interests of the United States,
but that authority is ordinarily exercised with great circumspection,
and even more so when the policy under review has been set not by
some subordinate executive officer, but by the highest level poli55
cymaking officials of the government.
Newly discovered evidence may lead the government's litigating
officials to abandon the position that the government's policymakers
have formulated. In the Japanese American cases, however, the basic factual infirmities of the government's position were known, if not
fully documented, at the time it was initially formulated. The issue
was therefore joined at that time. Once those government officials
who opposed evacuation had failed to prevent it from becoming the
official policy of the government, the litigating position of the United
States could not have been altered without substantial intragovernmental conflict. Thus, there was little chance that the measures imposed by the government would not be defended in litigation.
III.

Irons's Account

In Justice at War, Irons has offered an account of the circumstances surrounding the adoption and implementation of the govern54 Irons's account of the trials of the Japanese American cases (pp. 134-62) is certainly
the most interesting and best realized part Of JUSTICE AT WAR.
55 See, e.g., Griswold, The Ofte of the Solicitor General-Representingthe Interests of the United
States before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REv. 527 (1969); McCree, The Solicitor Generaland His
Client, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 337 (1981).
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ment's policy towards the Japanese Americans, the defense of that
policy in litigation, the consideration given by the courts to the constitutional questions raised by the Japanese Americans, and the ethical behavior of the various actors involved in these events. With
respect to each of these topics, the validity of Irons's account warrants consideration.
A.

Formulationof the Government's Policy

Irons's account of the events leading to the promulgation of Executive Order No. 9066 and the enactment of Public Law 503 follows
that given by previous scholars. In the weeks immediately following
Pearl Harbor, not even General DeWitt, the West Coast Army commander, favored mass evacuation. On December 26, 1941, General
Gullion, the Army's chief law enforcement officer, advised General
DeWitt that the Washington lobbyist for the Los Angeles Chamber
of Commerce was urging the evacuation of all ethnic Japanese, citizens as well as aliens (p. 29). Noting that he" 'had thought the thing
out to [his] satisfaction,' " General DeWitt stated his opinion that the
evacuation from California of all ethnic Japanese would not only be
" 'an awful job,' " but would also be "'very liable to alienate the
loyal Japanese'" (p. 29). Evacuation was simply unnecessary, General DeWitt contended, because the Army could "'weed the disloyal
out of the loyal and lock them up if necessary'" (p. 30).56
In early January, representatives of the Departments of Justice
and War met in San Francisco to discuss the Japanese American situation (pp. 32-33). The Justice Department was represented by James
Rowe, a New Deal veteran and assistant to Attorney General Francis
Biddle, and by Edward Ennis, an experienced government lawyer
who was then Director of the Justice Department's Alien Enemy
Control Unit. The War Department was represented by General DeWitt and Karl Bendetsen, General Gullion's assistant. The Justice
Department apparently had no agenda for this meeting and General
DeWitt succeeded in securing certain concessions concerning the
compulsory registration of aliens, the promulgation of contraband
regulations, the liberalization of procedures for searching alien prem56 On December 19, 1941, DeWitt had urged the evacuation of all aliens from the West
Coast (p. 27). Later in the month, he stated his opposition to mass evacuation, but pressed for
authority to conduct warrantless raids on the homes of Japanese aliens and to confiscate
shortwave radios, cameras, firearms and other articles that might be used in espionage and
sabotage (pp. 28-29). Civilian officials, such as FBI Director Hoover, opposed mass raids on
the ground that they " 'would not only be most difficult but would also have a very bad effect
on the law-abiding people who were raided'" (p. 29).
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ises, and the exclusion of aliens from limited geographical areas (pp.
34-35). As Professor Grodzins has noted, there was no discussion or
apparent dispute concerning mass evacuation:
As of January 7 the principal disagreements concerned search
procedures. There was no disagreement with respect to mass
evacuation. Evacuation of both citizens and aliens had not been
discussed, and Mr. Rowe left San Francisco with the definite impression that General DeWitt was
opposed to any large-scale
57
movement of citizens and aliens.
The call for mass evacuation had already been sounded, however, by some California special interest groups, and members of the
West Coast congressional delegation soon added their voices to the
call. According to Irons, "[t]his sporadic and unofficial campaign
took a dramatic turn on January 16, 1942, when Congressman Leland M. Ford, a California Republican, sent identical letters to Secretary of War Stimson and Attorney General Biddle urging that 'all
Japanese, whether citizens or not, be placed in inland concentration
camps'" (p. 38). In making this statement, Irons relies not on primary sources, but on Professor Grodzins's account, which he has
inaccurately summarized (p. 376 n.31). The "identical letters" of
January 16 noted by Professor Grodzins were letters from Ford to
Navy Secretary Frank Knox and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. 5
According to Grodzins, Ford wrote directly to Attorney General Biddle on January 23. 59 In any event, Ford wrote to both the Attorney
General and the Secretary of War in late January, and, despite the
fact that both men harbored grave doubts concerning the constitutionality of Ford's proposal, they made very different replies. Attorney General Biddle stated that "'unless the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended, I do not know any way in which Japanese born in this
country, and therefore American citizens, could be interned'" (p.
39). Secretary Stimson, on the other hand, replied that the internment of more than 100,000 people would involve some "'complex
considerations,' "but that " 'the Army is prepared to provide internment facilities in the interior to the extent necessary' " (p. 39).
Towards the end of January, the Justice Department began to
balk at General DeWitt's requests for authority to designate increasingly large parts of the West Coast as areas from which Japanese
57
58
59

M. GRODZINS, supra note 50, at 240 (footnote omitted).
Id at 64-65.
Id at 65.
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aliens should be excluded. 60 DeWitt, who was being barraged in
California with demands for mass evacuation, had become convinced
of its inevitability by January 29 (pp. 40-42), although his formal
recommendation to that effect would not be forwarded to Secretary
Stimson until February 17 (pp. 60-61).
After the West Coast congressional delegation had presented
Bendetsen, Rowe and Ennis with an elaborate evacuation plan on
January 30 (pp. 42-43), Biddle played what was to be his final card.
He called Secretary Stimson and asked him to send Assistant Secretary John McCloy to a meeting at the Justice Department on Sunday, February 1 (p. 44). At that meeting, Biddle handed McCloy a

statement which, Biddle said, he intended to release to the press that
evening over his and Stimson's signatures. The statement not only
related that the FBI had uncovered "no evidence of planned sabotage by any alien," but also stated that both Departments agreed
that the present military situation did not warrant the removal of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry (p. 44).

Biddle quickly

agreed to delay publication of the press release, however, until General DeWitt had been consulted (p. 44).
On February 5, the two Departments aired their disagreements
in testimony before a Senate Committee. Ennis testified that mass
evacuation could not be supported on the ground of military necessity because the Justice Department had already identified and arrested the disloyal Japanese, a point which had been made by FBI
Director Hoover in a February 1 memorandum to the Attorney General (p. 52). Yet Biddle conceded that the need for evacuation was a
military question, which immediately led Bendetsen to assert that the
military believed that the risk posed by the Japanese Americans was
substantial (p. 52).
On February 11, when Stimson finally seized the initiative by
telephoning the President and asking him to decide the matter, the
President replied that Stimson should do what he thought best (pp.
57-58). Bendetsen then prepared a memorandum recommending
evacuation and detention for submission to Stimson over DeWitt's
signature; Stimson adopted the recommendation (pp. 59-61). On
Febuary 17, Biddle sent the President a letter ridiculing the need for
evacuation, but by then Stimson had already made the decision (p.
61). When Justice and War Department officials met at Biddle's
home on the evening of February 17, all that remained for the Justice
Department lawyers was to clean up the syntax in the Executive Or60

J.

TENBROEK, E. BARNHART & E. MATSON,

supra note 50, at 106-09.
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der that the War Department had drafted (pp. 61-63).61
These facts have been recounted in some detail because they
constitute the salient facts of Irons's dense but unsatisfying account.
Irons asserts that the Justice Department was outmaneuvered by the
War Department, at least in part because Stimson and McCloy had
better access to the President than did their Justice Department
counterparts (pp. 16, 18). Yet, Irons presents no evidence that the
War Department had any contact with Roosevelt other than Stimson's telephone conversation with him on February 11, when
Roosevelt declined to grant Stimson a personal audience (p. 58).

Moreover, Rowe, who was opposed to evacuation, was a veteran
New Dealer known for his "political savvy and outspoken assertiveness" (p. 31). He was "on close and easy terms with Roosevelt," for

whom he had worked in the White House, and by whom he had
been personally assigned to the Justice Department (p. 32). If any-

one could have captured Roosevelt's attention, it would have been
Rowe. Similarly, Biddle had the opportunity to discuss the subject
with the President during lunch on February 7 (p. 53). But Biddle

did not question the constitutionality of the plan; he simply raised
logistical considerations, questioned the need for evacuation, and
then dropped the subject when he discerned the President's lack of
interest in it (p. 53).

Thus, while Irons attributes the decision to Roosevelt's alleged
insensitivity to racial minorities (pp. 57, 63), and to Biddle's inability
to stand up to Roosevelt and Stimson (p. 53), the facts do not support
that interpretation. Apart from the luncheon with Biddle and the
telephone call from Stimson, Irons has presented no evidence to show
that Roosevelt ever discussed the evacuation issue with either of
them. Nor has Irons presented any evidence to show that the situation was ever presented to the President in a way that focused his
attention on the constitutional questions involved. Finally, the evidence does not support Irons's contention that "the congressional
campaign for internment . . . gained the support of that consummate politician, Franklin Roosevelt" (p. 42). Roosevelt, who must

have been preoccupied with many important matters during the
opening days of the war, remains a shadowy figure in this drama.
Invocation of his alleged insensitivity to racial minorities falls far
61 Irons notes that Biddle had telephoned Roosevelt earlier in the day and pledged his
support for Stimson's decision (p. 62), but Irons does not explain how Biddle knew of the
decision or why he suddenly agreed to support it.
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short of reasoned explanation. 62
Irons's emphasis on Biddle's alleged inability to stand up to
Roosevelt and Stimson seems misplaced, not only because of
Roosevelt's apparent lack of personal participation in the decision,
but also because of the late date at which Stimson became committed to evacuation. As Irons points out, Stimson's diary shows that, as
late as February 12, he had serious "doubts about the constitutionality of a plan based on the 'racial characteristics' of one minority
group, and the Army's inability to back up its 'military necessity'
claim with hard evidence" (p. 57). Ironically, Biddle and Stimson
harbored the same constitutional misgivings concerning evacuation,
but the two men apparently never consulted with each other about
the question. Thus, at least at the Cabinet level, the adoption of the
evacuation policy appears to have resulted more from a failure of
communication than from a test of wills.
In Irons's account, it is Biddle's patrician ineptitude and political inexperience that were responsible for the Justice Department's
loss of the interdepartmental conflict over evacuation. Yet Rowewho was Biddle's proxy at the San Francisco meeting, his chief lieutenant at other meetings, and a veteran bureaucratic infighter who
clearly had access to the President-escapes censure.
From the viewpoint of administrative decision-making, there are
a number of critical questions that Irons has left unanswered. For
example, Congressman Ford's evacuation proposal was allowed to
drive an early wedge between the Justice and War Departments because of the inconsistent replies made by Stimson and Biddle. If
Irons's account is accurate on this point, the two Departments made
no effort to formulate a common response to Ford's proposal. Did
Biddle and Stimson know that they were both the objects of Ford's
importuning? Even if they did not actually know that Ford had
written to both of them, would much imagination have been required, given the overlapping jurisdictions of the two Departments,
to guess that Ford's attack would be two-pronged? In any event,
given the rapid development of anti-Japanese animus on the West
Coast, and the increasing support for evacuation of all persons of
62

Indeed, the only direct evidence of Roosevelt's own views which Irons recites is a one-

page memorandum which the President dispatched to the Chief of Naval Operations in August 1936 (p. 20). In that memorandum, Roosevelt suggested that a list be kept of Japanese
Americans meeting Japanese ships in Hawaii to facilitate their placement " 'in a concentration camp in the event of trouble.'" Id. Given the early date and limited subject matter of
this memorandum, there is little basis for asserting, as Irons does, that it constitutes "a chilling
forecast of Roosevelt's later approval of internment on the mainland." Id. (footnote omitted).
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Japanese ancestry, why was there no effort to work out a joint position on the issue? Indeed, why did Biddle wait until February 9 to
bring his views to Stimson's personal attention (pp. 53-55), and then
only by letter? By the same token, why was it that Stimson, who was
clearly troubled by the constitutional implications of evacuation (p.
57), did not seek the views of the Justice Department on the subject?
Curiously, Irons suggests that Biddle's difficulty in taking issue with
Stimson, whom Biddle later described as an " 'heroic figure of sincerity and strength,'" became important, "during their face-to-face
meetings over the evacuation issue" (p. 17). But Irons does not recount a single meeting between the two men prior to the final drafting of Executive Order No. 9066 (p. 62). Even if one accepts Irons's
view that Biddle was intimidated by Stimson, why did Biddle fail to
bring other Cabinet members into the decision-making process?
Might not the support of Secretary Morgenthau and Secretary Ickes
have made a difference, as Professor Burns has suggested? 63 What
views, if any, were held by the White House staff? And why was the
matter never discussed in the Cabinet?
The answers to these questions would be essential to any real
understanding of the process by which the government embarked
upon its wartime policy towards the Japanese Americans. Yet none
of these questions is addressed, let alone answered, in Justice at War.
For this part of the story, Irons has mainly relied on a patchwork of
secondary sources and a few newly discovered documents for weaving together a plausible, but superficial, chronology of events. Although Irons interviewed many of the key participants, including
Ennis and Rowe, he appears to have asked the wrong questions or,
64
perhaps, to have ignored the answers.
63 J. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 215 (1970).
64 Marc Bloch, the French historian, has suggested that every "historical book worthy of
the name ought to include a chapter, or if one prefers, a series of paragraphs inserted at
turning points in the development, which might almost be entitled: 'How can I know what I
am about to say?'" M. BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN'S CRAir 71 (Putnam trans. 1953). Bloch's
rationale is obvious. An historian's conclusions are not susceptible to demonstration in the
same way as a chemist's. Whether the chemist's hypothesis is correct depends on the repetition of his result. The soundness of historical conclusions, on the other hand, can be judged
only in view of the credibility of the evidence and the integrity of the inferences that have
been drawn from it. Oral history presents special problems because the reader needs to know
the questions asked, the answers given, the circumstances of the interview, and, especially, the
amount and kind of preparation done by the historian and his witness. Irons has disclosed
nothing about the methodology that he used in interviewing his witnesses, even though they
were interviewed concerning events which occurred more than 40 years ago, and which, while
certainly important, clearly were not even then the exclusive or principal concerns of the
witnesses.
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Liligation of the Japanese American Cases

The discussion of the government's litigation of the Japanese
American cases injustice at War is also populated with Irons's heroes
and villains: "Two groups of lawyers jockeyed for position inside the
Justice Department, one in the Alien Enemy Control Unit headed by
Edward Ennis and the other in the Office of Solicitor General
Charles Fahy" (p. 195). In Irons's view, Fahy demeaned the Office of
Solicitor General by choosing to act as the mouthpiece for the War
Department, rather than representing the broader interests of the
United States (p. 196). Ennis, on the other hand, "made no secret
either of his belief that Public Law 503 was unconstitutional or of his
distrust of War Department arguments" (p. 196). Thus, Ennis followed the dictates of common morality and legal ethics, while Fahy
was interested only in his win-loss record (pp. 164, 224). These are
serious charges which are not supported by the evidence that Irons
has mustered.
Fahy's first significant contact with the Japanese American cases
apparently occurred when Ennis forwarded the draft brief in Hirabayashi to the Solicitor General's Office in late April 1943, just days
before the brief was to be filed in the Supreme Court (pp. 202, 204) .65
The Supreme Court had expedited the case and scheduled oral argument for May 10 (pp. 219-20). Ennis was intimately involved with
the details of the litigation. Not only had he overseen the preparation of the draft brief, but he also had been primarily responsible for
litigating the government's position in the lower federal courts (pp.
119, 167). Irons asserts that, "[a]s their debates over the Hirabayashi
brief progressed,. . Ennis found that Fahy remained unyielding in
his determination to defer to the War Department" (p. 196). Irons

fails to provide any detailed account of these "debates," however,
and it seems far-fetched that any debates could have "progressed"
very far in the short time available to the Solicitor General to put
Ennis's draft in final form. The centerpiece of Irons's development of
65 Irons asserts that Fahy became involved in the Japanese American cases at an early
stage (p. 120), but he mentions only two fleeting contacts prior to April 1943. On the first
occasion, in late December 1942, Ennis sought Fahy's advice as to whether the government
should ask the district judge to expedite his decision in Endo, which Fahy thought imprudent
(p. 150). On the second occasion, also in December 1942, Ennis suggested that the government dismiss the Japanese American cases (p. 163). Although Fahy rejected Ennis's suggestion, which was equivocal in any event, Fahy accepted the alternative suggestion that he
delegate to Ennis the responsibility for coordinating the litigations (p. 167). There is virtually
no support in the record for Irons's colorful assertion that Fahy and Ennis were positioned
like "scorpions in a bottle" (p. 164).
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this theme is a memorandum which Ennis prepared for Fahy on
April 30, 1943, approximately ten days before the case was to be argued. This appears, even by Irons's reckoning, to be the first time
that Fahy was made aware of Ennis's "suppression of evidence"
charges.
In this memorandum, Ennis drew Fahy's attention to an a:'ticle
that had appeared in the October 1942 issue of Harer-s under the
pseudonymous byline of "An Intelligence Officer." This article asserted that the government's mass evacuation policy had not been
deemed necessary by the Office of Naval Intelligence, which was
principally responsible for intelligence gathering on the West Coast.
Ennis reported to Fahy that the article, which Ennis had sent a few
days earlier to one of Fahy's assistants, reflected the views, " 'if not of
the Navy, at least of those Naval Intelligence officers in charge of
Japanese counter-intelligence work'" (pp. 202-03). Far from being
novel, however, the opinion expressed in the article was the same
opinion which Ennis and Biddle had been given by the FBI more
than a year earlier, and which Ennis had duly reported to a Senate
committee on February 5, 1942, two weeks before the President
signed Executive Order No. 9066 (pp. 23, 44). Ennis now asserted
that the Solicitor General's failure to apprise the Supreme Court of
this evidence, which Ennis apparently had felt no need to disclose in
the lower courts, " 'might approximate the suppression of evidence'
(p. 204).
Irons asserts that Fahy "rebuffed" Ennis's efforts to put this material before the Supreme Court (p. 206), but Irons does not report

the substance of any discussion that Fahy and Ennis may have had
on this subject, and Irons does not indicate whether Fahy personally
reviewed the materials that Ennis had sent to him. Even if Fahy did
read the materials, it is questionable whether they would have made
any impression on him in these circumstances. Not only were the
materials submitted to him at the eleventh hour, but they merely
corroborated the views already expressed by the FBI. In any event,
Irons does not explain why Ennis waited so long to drop this alleged
"bombshell." Moreover, while the documents in Ennis's possession
allegedly "refuted at almost every point the conclusions drawn" in
the draft brief which he had submitted to the Solicitor General (p.
206), Irons does not explain why Ennis prepared and submitted the
brief in that form. It is indeed curious that a responsible government
lawyer would transmit a draft brief, which always carries the implicit
representation that it is ready for filing, and then submit a separate
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memorandum asserting that the contents of the brief were materially
false. Irons offers no explanation for this unusual conduct. Nor does
he explain how Ennis possibly could have given "up for the time his
objection to Fahy's 'suppression of evidence' " and added his signature to the government's brief (p. 206).
Irons's account of Fahy's role in the preparation of the Koremalsu
brief in September 1944 is also inconclusive. In early 1944, the War
Department published General DeWitt's final report on the evacuation, which chastised the Justice Department for its lack of cooperation, contained assertions of fact that were inconsistent with those
made by other agencies, such as the FBI, the FCC, and the Office of
Naval Intelligence, and contained an overtly racist justification for
evacuation (pp. 278-79). At Ennis's suggestion, Biddle requested that
the FBI prepare an analysis of the factual information contained in
DeWitt's report (p. 280). Both the FBI and the FCC eventually submitted reports which again contested the accuracy of much of that
information (pp. 281-87).66 The draft brief which Ennis's staff prepared for submission to the Solicitor General contained the following
footnote:
"The recital of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a
matter of military necessity, however, is in several respects, particularly with reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and
shore-to-ship signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information in the possession of the Department of Justice. In view of the contrariety of the reports on this matter we
do not ask the Court to take judicial notice of the recital of those
facts contained in the Report."
(p. 286). The Solicitor General's staff apparently simplified this footnote to state only that the Justice and War Departments held divergent views as to the reliability of this evidence. Irons asserts that this
editorial change "concealed the existence of the FBI and FCC reports that refuted DeWitt's espionage charges" (p. 286). But neither
the original nor the amended footnote specifically referred to these
reports, and, while the Solicitor General's version was more general,
it certainly conveyed the extraordinary message that the Justice De66 Irons devotes substantial attention to the War Department's suppression of DeWitt's
report between April 1943 and January 1944 (pp. 206-12, 278-93). Given the significance
that Irons attributes to this episode, it is unfair for him to purport to identify, without any
factual citation, what it was that McCloy found "alarming" when he first read the report (pp.
207-08). One plausible explanation for the War Department's suppression of the report is
that it represented the views of General DeWitt, rather than the views of the Secretary of
War, whose decision was at issue. To have released the report at the time it was written
might well have confused that issue, as it ultimately did.
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partment did not stand with the War Department on a critical issue
in the case. Either version was likely to provoke tough questioning at
oral argument.
Although the precise chronology of events is not clear from
Irons's account, it appears that the War Department objected strenuously to both versions of the footnote, that Fahy first insisted on including the version prepared by Ennis's staff, and then offered the
War Department a choice between his version and a still milder version prepared by Herbert Wechsler, who put the matter so obliquely
that only the most circumspect reader could possibly detect any suggestion of the conflict between the two Departments (pp. 287-91).
The War Department naturally chose the Wechsler version, but
Irons does not explain why Fahy took the various positions that he
did. In this instance as well, however, the dispute seems to have
come to a boil at the last conceivable moment. The brief was already
in the print shop; the presses had to be stopped twice to accommodate the airing of the dispute (pp. 288, 290).
C. Supreme Court Deliberations
Perhaps the least satisfactory portion ofjustice at War is that devoted to the Supreme Court's deliberations in the Japanese American cases (pp. 219-52, 311-46). The only tangible evidence of
Supreme Court deliberations are the occasional notes made by the
individual Justices to refresh their recollections about points made
during the conference, the draft opinions preserved in the papers of
the individual Justices, and any preserved correspondence that may
have passed among the Justices commenting on the various drafts.
Although this evidence is seductive because of its tangible character,
it really tells us little about the decision-making process, which also
includes informal discussions among the Justices, discussions between
the Justices and their law clerks, and the Justices' independent study
of the case before them.
At the initial conference in Hirabayashi,only Justice Murphy
failed to register his tentative vote in favor of the government; he was
not prepared to vote one way or the other (p. 234). Irons points out
that four other Justices voiced various concerns about the government's policy prior to the announcement of the Court's unanimous
decision, but that all of the wavering Justices eventually set aside
their reservations because of "[c]ompromise, cajolery, and their own
concerns that the Court should maintain unity" (p. 250). Irons suggests that Justice Frankfurter, to whom he patronizingly refers as
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"the irrepressible Supreme Court [J]ustice under whom McCloy had
studied at Harvard" (p. 16), was largely responsible for wearing
down the resolve of the potential dissenters (p. 239). Irons further

suggests that Frankfurter may have been motivated by his close personal associations with Stimson and McCloy (p. 239). Yet, Irons fails
to note that Justice Frankfurter and McCloy had actually exchanged
correspondence on the subject, and that Justice Frankfurter had assured McCloy in April 1942 that he "'was handling [this] delicate
matter with both wisdom and appropriate hard-headedness.' ",67 Although a good question might well be raised as to whether Justice
Frankfurter should have recused himself because of his correspondence with McCloy specifically concerning the case, Irons's generalized assertions of friendship lay no foundation for raising this issue.
Whatever the motivation, nature or scope of Justice Frankfurter's efforts in Hirabayashito persuade his brethren of the constitutionality of the government's policy, the fact remains that the final
vote was essentially the same as the impression vote at the conference. Justice Murphy prepared and circulated a draft dissenting
opinion, but failed to gain a single adherent to his position. In the
end, Justice Murphy gave in to his prior indecision and transformed
his dissenting opinion into a half-hearted concurrence (pp. 246-47).
The process by which Hirabayashiwas decided seems as free, robust
and uninhibited as can be expected within the context of collegial
decision-making. Justice Murphy did his best to persuade his brethren based on the evidence and arguments that he then had available
to him. Unfortunately, of course, he was unable in Hirabyaslhi to
make the point-by-point rebuttal to the government's case that he
was able to formulate in Korematsu. That rebuttal depended upon
General DeWitt's report, which had been suppressed by the War Department. When the ammunition became available in Korematsu, the
choice available to the Justices could not have been put more bluntly
than it was by Justice Murphy when he registered his dissent "from
this legalization of racism."' 68 In Korema/su, the Court splintered, but
the majority had already committed themselves to the approach articulated in Hirabayshi* While it may be titillating to pierce the
Supreme Court's cloak of secrecy, it is questionable whether Irons
has told us anything of consequence that we did not know well
enough from reading the opinions themselves.
67
68

PERSONAL JUSTIcE DENIED, supra note 1, at 113.

323 U.S. at 213.
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D.

Ethical Considerations

Irons's consideration of the ethical questions posed by the conduct of the various lawyers involved in the Japanese American cases
also warrants discussion. Although Irons's consideration of these
questions is a major focus of the book, it is appropriate that they
should be considered last because their vitality necessarily rests upon
the reader's evaluation of the factual predicate that Irons has ostensibly established for discussing them. There is no question, of course,
as to where Irons stands. At the very outset, he asserts thatjustice at
War is the story of a "legal scandal without precedent in the history
of American law" (p. viii). That is a point far different, and far less
obvious, than the point on which he closes the book, quoting Mr.
Korematsu's words, "'[t]hey did me a great wrong'" (p. 367). The
facts recounted injustice at War are surely sufficient to show that the
Japanese Americans were done "a great wrong," but that point was
demonstrated long ago. Whether the facts show a "legal scandal
without precedent in the history of American law" is a far different
question which Irons has not answered because he has not provided a
sufficiently close analysis of the facts. He has described events, but
he has failed to probe with any acuity the background of the decisions that led to those events. In the absence of such a foundation,
the reader has no business atteipting to make the ethical judgments
which Irons invites him to make (p. xi).
Irons has not equipped the reader to evaluate objectively the
ethical shortcomings of the lawyers involved. One of the major deficiencies of this book is its surfeit of advocacy, and this segment of the
book, despite the author's disclaimers, is not exceptional in that respect. Three examples illustrate the point. First, Irons deals harshly
with Captain Herbert Wenig, a former Assistant Attorney General of
California who participated, while also serving on DeWitt's legal
staff, in the drafting of an amicus curiae brief which the Western states
submitted in Hirabayashi(pp. 121, 180, 212-17). Wenig's dual role
surely presented ethical problems because he used the opportunity to
present to the Court materials that the Justice Department, which
had responsibility for representing the government, chose not to present (pp. 215-17).69 Irons is not content to rest on that fact, but contends that Wenig's conduct would have violated fundamental ethical
69 Wenig apparently did not use classified information in drafting the brief. Although he
used material that was recited in the suppressed report, that material had been plagiarized
from the reports of the Tolan and Dies committees (pp. 212-17). Thus, Irons's description of
"the use made of the Final Report" (p. 217) is somewhat deceptive insofar as it implies that
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rules in any circumstance. He states: "Judicial rules prohibit the
direct participation of a party to a lawsuit in the preparation of [an]
amicus brief" (p. 213). That Irons cites no authority for that proposition is not surprising because it is not substantiated by common
experience. In fact, lawyers for parties and their supporting amici curiae often assist each other for the simple reason that the coordination
repetitious and
of briefs on the same side is likely to result in a less
70
concerns.
common
of
presentation
more effective
Second, Irons's lack of even-handedness is demonstrated by his
assertion that Ennis merely "stretched the limits of professional obligation in meeting with Roger Baldwin and Charles Horsky to help
shape the legal strategy of the American Civil Liberties Union in the
Korematsu case" (p. 302). If Wenig acted improperly in working on
an amicus brief, he was at least assisting amici on the same side of the
case. Ennis, on the other hand, was deeply enmeshed in planning. the
strategy for his opponent in litigation (pp. 182, 260-61, 267, 304-07).
Whatever the vagaries of legal ethics, Ennis's conduct did not merely
"stretch the limits of professional obligation." Ennis's conduct was
profoundly unethical. If his activities had been known to his superiors, he surely, and quite deservedly, would have been relieved of his
7
duties. '
Finally, a large part of the book concerns the allegedly unethical
conduct of the American Civil Liberties Union. According to Irons,
the national leadership of the ACLU "bear[s] much of the blame for
the outcome of the Japanese American cases" because their "personal and partisan loyalty" to President Roosevelt "crippled the effective presentation of these appeals" (p. ix). Whether the conduct of
the ACLU materially affected the outcome of the Japanese American cases is surely open to question. Irons's observation is interesting,
however, because it reveals the ethical yardstick against which he
measures the conduct of the ACLU. Irons apparently criticizes the
Wenig used information which, because of the War Department's suppression of the DeWitt
report, was available only to him. Clearly, that was not the case.
70 See, e.g., Shapiro, Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court, 10 LITIGATION 21, 24 (1984); Ennis,
Efkctive Amicus Briefs, 33 OATH. U.L. REv. 603, 606-08 (1984).
71 A further example of Irons's selective discussion of ethical considerations is his offhand remark that agents of the FBI had told Nanette Dembitz, a member of Ennis's staff,
that they would provide her with materials they had gathered from the trash of Wayne Collins, one of the lawyers for Korematsu, so that she would be aware of the development of his
strategy (p. 197). Irons does not state whether Dembitz accepted this offer. Similarly, Irons
gives little attention to the propriety of Ennis's ex parte submissions to the Ninth Circuit,
which resulted in the transfer of the three criminal cases to the Supreme Court's docket (pp.
182-83).
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ACLU for not providing sufficient support to the Japanese Americans at an early stage of the litigations (pp. 108-18, 129-36, 168-75)
and for using its financial support of the Hirabqyashi case in the
Supreme Court to block a constitutional attack on Executive Order
No. 9066, as opposed to Public Law 503 and the military orders (pp.
184-93, 254-67).
Neither criticism is well founded. First, the ACLU cannot fairly
be faulted for not immediately supporting the Japanese Americans.
The ACLU is not a legal aid organization; it undertakes to finance
the litigation of certain cases based on the views of its leadership as to
desirable constitutional policy. Such an organization has no obligation to provide counsel for every individual in need of representation,
nor is it required by some higher law to commit its resources to advance positions which its leadership considers unwise as a matter of
strategy or substantive principle. As Irons notes, the Japanese American cases presented novel questions of constitutional law (pp. vii,
104, 135). Thus, it is not surprising that the ACLU Board, whose
membership spanned the ideological spectrum (p. 106), had difficulty in settling on a consistent approach (p. 108). Moreover, Irons

offers no evidence to show that the positions taken by the various
members of the ACLU Board were based on political considerations
rather than sincerely held views as to the meaning of the
Constitution.
Irons's second criticism is also wide of the mark. Once having
agreed to provide support, an organization like the ACLU must candidly deal with its client concerning any possible divergence of interests, so that the client can decide whether to forego the contested
point or seek new counsel. But, if Irons is correct in asserting that
Hirabayashi and the ACLU held divergent interests, the relevant
ethical question is whether the ACLU made any litigation strategy
decision without Hirabayashi's full knowledge and consent. Since
Justiceat War does not address that question, Irons has not established
the factual predicate for his conclusion of unethical conduct. In sum,
the divisions within the ACLU may be interesting, but from an ethical perspective their importance is secondary.
IV.

Conclusion

The Japanese American cases are inherently interesting and a
great book could have been written on this subject. Despite the Freedom of Information Act, the work of the Commission on Wartime
Relocation, and the oral history interviews which Irons conducted,
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that book remains to be written. In Irons's book, there is too little
attention to detail, too little focus on essential questions, and far too
little effort to be fair and objective.
The shortcomings ofJustce at War are rooted in the discontinuity which necessarily separates the domains of history and advocacy.
As Professor Butterfield has wryly suggested, "for the compilation of
trenchant history there is nothing like being content with half the
truth. ' 72 To say that Justice at War consciously tells only "half the
truth" would certainly be unfair. Likewise, to say that "half the
truth" is the lawyer's stock in trade would overstate the point. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the lawyer's profession is persuasion, not
explanation. If an advocate is to be persuasive, he must be selective,
both in his arrangement of the facts and in the inferences he draws
from them. To serve the purposes of advocacy, he will at least paint
with a broader brush. Despite certain superficial similarities, .the
ends of these two enterprises-history and advocacy-are fundamentally different.
Irons's failure rests largely on his own efforts to play two incompatible parts. Irons acted as counsel for Hirabayashi, Yasui and
Korematsu in the recent coram nobis proceedings which they instituted. 73 In those proceedings, Irons and his colleagues had to persuade the courts that their clients' convictions were tainted by
"fundamental error" or "manifest injustice" (p. viii). As lawyers,
they were required to shoulder a singularly heavy burden. Although
Irons acknowledges the tension between his roles as historian and ad72 H. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 7, at 52.
73 In January 1983, Fred Korematsu filed a petition for a writ of coram nobzi in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming that his conviction
should be set aside because, among other things, the government had suppressed or destroyed
evidence in the proceedings which led to that conviction and its affirmance. Korematsu v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) appealdocketed, No. 84-1235 (9th Cir. Aug.
31, 1984). The government sought to avoid a decision on the merits of Korematsu's claim by
asking the court to vacate the conviction and dismiss the criminal complaint. Finding no
precedent to support the government's suggestion (id at 14 10-11), and in view of the government's failure to contest Korematsu's claim that his conviction constituted a grave miscarriage of justice (id at 1420), the district court granted the writ. The court declined to reach
any of the legal errors presented by Korematsu, however, holding that the correction of legal
errors was beyond the court's power in a coram nobis proceeding. Id In Yasui v. United States,
No. CV83-151 (D. Ore. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-3730 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1984), the district court granted the government's countermotion to dismiss the indictment and vacate
Yasui's conviction. The court declined to make the specific factual findings requested by
Yasui "forty years after they took place" on the ground that the parties' agreement as to
Yasui's entitlement to relief had effectively mooted the controversy (slip op. at 2). A similar
action filed by Gordon Hirabayashi is still pending in the district court. Hirabayashi v.
United States, No. C83-122V (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 31, 1983).
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vocate, he claims to have separated those roles, and he asserts that
Justice at War should not be construed "as a brief on.

.

.behalf' of

his clients (p. xii). Unfortunately, that is precisely what it is.

